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MOSTLY HARMLESS: AN ANALYSIS OF POST-AEDPA
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW OF STATE
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Jeffrey S. Jacobi*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IN TRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 805
I. THE RESULTS OF FEDERAL HABEAS
HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSES ................................................... 809
II. How FEDERAL HABEAS COURTS CONDUCT
HARMLESS ERROR REVIEW ....................................................... 812
A. How Courts Say Harmless Error Review
Should Be Conducted ........................................................ 814
B. How Circuit Courts Actually Conduct
Harm less Error Review ..................................................... 818
C. The Current State of Harmless Error Analysis
Is N ot H arm less ................................................................. 822
111. G ROUP 2 H AS IT RIGHT ............................................................ 823
A. Chapman's "Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt ..... 824
B. Jurisdiction Stripping ........................................................ 825
C. The M uddled M iddle ......................................................... 827
C O N CLU SION ......................................................................................... 83 1
A PPEN D IX .............................................................................................. 832
INTRODUCTION
Sixty years ago, in Kotteakos v. United States, the Supreme Court ruled
that a small class of so-called harmless errors committed by courts did not
require correction.' The Court acknowledged that some judicial errors,
though recognizable as errors, did not threaten the validity of criminal con-
victions and therefore did not require reversal.2 Specifically, the Court held
that errors that violated federal statutes should be deemed harmless unless
they had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the
* J.D. candidate, May 2007. 1 wish to thank Professor Eve L. Brensike and the students in
the Habeas Corpus seminar for their assistance in the development of this Note. I also wish to ex-
press my gratitude to the Note Editors for their invaluable advice.
I. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
2. Id. at 776.
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jury's verdict."3 While Kotteakos represented the Supreme Court's first
treatment of the concept of harmlessness, other courts had a history of pre-
serving convictions using harmless error review.5 For some time before
Kotteakos, state statutes had directed appellate courts throughout the country
to use harmless error review,6 a doctrine that prevents appellate courts from
disposing of convictions on technicalities,7 "conserve[s] judicial resources
by enabling appellate courts to cleanse the judicial process of prejudicial
error without becoming mired in harmless error,"8 and allows courts to focus
on "decid[ing] the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence."9
The Supreme Court expanded the category of harmless errors when it
first allowed appellate courts to disregard certain criminal trial errors that
violated the United States Constitution.' ° In 1967, Chapman v. California
concluded that "before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless,
the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a rea-
sonable doubt."" Chapman thus provided a more burdensome standard for
more troublesome errors. For over a quarter of a century, constitutional
errors deemed "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" under Chapman,3 and
federal law errors that had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury's verdict" under Kotteakos, 4 did not warrant relief on
federal habeas corpus review.
The Court retooled harmless error review again in 1993, this time address-
ing criminal claims on federal habeas corpus review and making it easier for
federal habeas courts to call constitutional errors harmless. 5 Brecht v. Abra-
hamson announced that one harmless error standard should apply to all cases
on federal collateral review.' 6 The Court directed the lower courts to review
3. Id.
4. Jason S. Marks, Harmless Constitutional Error: Fundamental Fairness and Constitu-
tional Integrity, CRIM. JUST., Spring 1993, at 2, 3.
5. See 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 27.6(a) (2d ed. 1999); see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967) (noting that all fifty
states had harmless error statutes or rules by 1967).
6. See I LAFAVE, ISRAEL, & KING, supra note 5, § 1.5(d) (asserting that state legislatures
enacted general harmless error statutes in the early 1900s).
7. United States v. Green, 847 F.2d 622, 625 (10th Cir. 1998).
8. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 509 (1983) (quoting ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE
RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 81 (1970)).
9. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (citation omitted).
10. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 22.
11. Id. at 24.
12. See United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 446 (1986) ("[T]he standard for harmless-error
analysis adopted in Chapman concerning constitutional errors is considerably more onerous than the
standard for nonconstitutional errors adopted in Kotteakos v. United States." (citation omitted)).
13. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
14. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946).
15. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 622-23 (1993).
16. See id.
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both constitutional errors and errors of federal law, which had previously been
subject to two different standards of harmless error review, under the less peti-
tioner-friendly standard of Kotteakos v. United States.7
Only three years later, Congress enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which amended the federal
habeas corpus statute. AEDPA added a provision that precluded federal ha-
beas relief when a state court decision was neither "contrary to, [nor] ... an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States."'" The Supreme Court inter-
preted this statute as allowing federal habeas relief only when a federal
habeas court could establish that a state court determination was not simply
error, but an objectively unreasonable application of federal law.' 9
In May of 2005, seeking to end the "extraordinary delays" often created
by "a single Federal judge" on federal habeas review,2° Congress proposed
the Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005 (SPA). 2' If enacted, this statute
would have stripped the jurisdiction of federal courts in a small but signifi-
cant way: the SPA would have eliminated federal review of any sentencing
2
error found by a state court to be harmless or nonprejudicial . According to
the bill's proponents, the problem is that federal "judges are acting ... law-
lessly" in reversing state court denials of collateral relief, and therefore "[i]t
is not unreasonable for Congress to ... seek to circumscribe federal judicial
discretion. 23
17. See id. (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 776). The Court stated that the "Kotteakos harm-
less-error standard is better tailored to the nature and purpose of collateral review than the Chapman
standard, and application of a less onerous harmless-error standard on habeas promotes the consid-
erations underlying our habeas jurisprudence." Id. at 623.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000). Previously, federal courts reviewed mixed questions of
law and fact from state court convictions de novo. Jennifer Park, Yarborough v. Alvarado: At the
Crossroads of the "Unreasonable Application" Provision of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 and the Consideration of Juvenile Status in Custodial Determinations, 95 J.
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 871, 874 (2005). AEDPA changed this analysis by requiring federal
courts to determine merely whether the state court determination was objectively unreasonable. Id.
19. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 365 (2000).
20. Terrorist Death Penalty Enhancement Act of 2005, and the Streamlined Procedures Act
of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 3060 and H.R. 3035 Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2005) [hereinafter Hearing]
(statement of Rep. Coble, Member, House Comm. on the Judiciary).
21. Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong. (2005). The Streamlined
Procedures Act is currently stalled in the Senate Judiciary Committee. GovTrack.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=s109-1088 (last visited Nov. 5, 2006) (noting that
action was last taken on November 16, 2005 and that the bill has been referred to the Senate Judici-
ary Committee). Even if this particular bill never becomes law, this proposal signals that Congress
may again attempt to curtail habeas jurisdiction through jurisdiction stripping in the near future.
22. Streamlined Procedures Act § 6 ("A court, justice, or judge shall not have jurisdiction to
consider an application with respect to an error relating to the applicant's sentence or sentencing that
has been found to be harmless or not prejudicial in State court proceedings, unless a determination
that the error is not structural is contrary to clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.").
23. Ted Frank, How Important is Habeas?: Ted Frank and David Bruck Debate, LEGAL
AFFAIRS, Aug. 1, 2005, http://www.legalaffairs.org/webexclusive/dc-printerfriendly.msp?id=54; see
February 20071
Michigan Law Review
This Note will show that the bill's proponents have misidentified the
problem. The real problem is that federal habeas courts have differing inter-
pretations of the law of harmless error and thus diverge in their application
of harmless error review. The problem is not that federal judges are using
their jurisdiction to grant unmeritorious habeas petitions by capriciously
reversing state court harmless error determinations because, as shown be-
low, most federal habeas courts rarely reverse state court harmless error
determinations. Instead, the current articulation of harmless error law gives
federal habeas courts inadequate guidance. While stripping the courts of
jurisdiction might solve the problem of legal uncertainty by removing the
question altogether, such a radical procedure would be "the functional
equivalent of amputating four limbs to improve the blood flow of a healthy
and functioning human being. 24
This Note argues that the Supreme Court should clarify the standard by
which federal habeas courts conduct harmless error review where there is a
state court determination of harmlessness. This Note organizes three and a
half years' worth of federal habeas court harmless error analyses into four
categories and concludes that the best analysis is that in which the Brecht
standard is integrated into AEDPA's analysis. Part I of this Note surveys
habeas corpus cases over the course of three and a half years, from January
2003 through June 2006, and concludes that Congress's proposed action,
jurisdiction stripping, is an inappropriate measure because most circuit
courts already regularly agree with the harmless error determinations of
state courts. Part II argues that the Supreme Court should clarify how to ap-
ply Brecht and AEDPA in federal review of state court harmless error
determinations because the law is unclear. Part III discusses several ap-
proaches to federal review of state court harmless error determinations and
ultimately argues that the proper solution is to adopt a uniform analysis for
harmless error that integrates the Brecht standard into AEDPA's analysis.
Hearing, supra note 20, at 90 (statement of Ron Eisenberg, Deputy District Attorney, Philadelphia
District Attorney's Office).
24. Hearing, supra note 20, at 99 (statement of Bernard E. Harcourt, Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of Chicago).
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I. THE RESULTS OF FEDERAL HABEAS HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSES
Scholars, courts, and practitioners claim, among other things,25 that
"many Federal courts seem flatly unwilling to affirm capital sentences." 6 In
response, federal lawmakers have proposed the SPA, which would strip fed-
eral courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction when a state court has deemed a
sentencing error harmless." But the SPA's proponents have got it wrong; this
reform will not significantly affect the number of state court decisions, capi-
tal or otherwise, that are affirmed. As this Part concludes, the SPA provides
an ineffective solution because most circuit courts already regularly agree
with the harmless error determinations of state courts.
Far from being "flatly unwilling to affirm ' 2s state court convictions or
sentences, a survey of every available circuit court habeas opinion decided
29
over the span of three and a half years reveals that in cases in which the
25. Critics of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction complain that federal "habeas jurisdiction
clogs federal calendars with frivolous claims and thus wastes valuable judicial resources'" Larry W.
Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1010 (1985). Federal habeas review
allegedly creates a backlog that "prejudice[s] the occasional meritorious application to be buried in a
flood of worthless ones." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). Com-
plaints are often lodged at federal habeas review because federal courts "second-guess judgments
that may have been affirmed by the states' highest courts" and "undercut the 'finality' of court
judgments." Yackle, supra, at 1010 (citing Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal
Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963)). Finally, some commentators
complain that because federal courts are so removed from the crime and the trial, they do not give
credit to the judgments of the state courts or think about the interests of crime victims. Hearing,
supra note 20, at 93 (statement of Ron Eisenberg, Deputy District Attorney, Philadelphia District
Attorney's Office) ("Federal habeas courts have great power, simply because they are last in line.
But they have little responsibility, because they are so far removed in time and space from the cir-
cumstances of the crime and the subtleties of the state proceedings. Accordingly, they have small
motive to act expeditiously or efficiently, to give credit to the judgments of their brethren in state
courts, or to consider the needs of crime victims.").
26. Hearing, supra note 20, at 89 (statement of Ron Eisenberg, Deputy District Attorney,
Philadelphia District Attorney's Office).
27. Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong. § 6 (2005).
28. Hearing, supra note 20, at 89 (statement of Ron Eisenberg, Deputy District Attorney,
Philadelphia District Attorney's Office).
29. To determine the necessity of a measure like section 6 of the proposed Streamlined Pro-
cedures Act of 2005, which strips federal courts of habeas jurisdiction whenever a state court has
properly determined a sentencing error harmless, I scoured electronic databases for circuit court
habeas cases that discussed harmless error.
Because I wanted to know how federal habeas courts had dealt with two different standards of
review-AEDPA's "contrary to" and "unreasonable application" provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)
(2000), and Brecht's separate requirement of a "substantial and injurious effect," Brecht v. Abra-
hamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)-I discarded cases concerning petitions filed before the
enactment of AEDPA, and therefore not subject to AEDPA. I limited the survey to opinions decided
after January 1, 2003, mostly because I noticed that older opinions tended to adjudicate claims filed
before AEDPA was enacted. I also discarded opinions addressing petitions from prisoners in federal
custody because AEDPA's deference applies only where there is a decision by the state. I then read
through every remaining case's discussion of harmless error review to determine whether a state
court had previously conducted harmless error review.
Sometimes, this was not apparent. When circuit court opinions did not mention whether the
state had conducted harmless error review, I read the available state opinions and the appellate briefs
to determine whether the state had called the errors harmless. I discarded cases in which there was
no discernable state court determination of harmlessness. Sixty-eight circuit court opinions contain-
ing discussions of harmless error when a state court had also conducted harmless error review
February 20071
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state court explicitly found an error harmless or non-prejudicial, most circuit
courts, with the notable exceptions of the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, seemed
"flatly unwilling" to reverse a denial of a petition for a writ of habeas cor-
pus.0 From the beginning of 2003 to the end of June 2006, the circuit courts
heard 68 habeas appeals in which a state court had explicitly determined
that all apparent federal and constitutional errors were harmless."' The cir-
cuit courts agreed with the state courts that the errors were harmless in 52 of
these cases (76.5%) and disagreed with the state court's determination of
harmlessness, finding the errors non-harmless, in 16 cases (23.5%)."2 At first
blush, these aggregate rates may seem high; the circuit courts appear to dis-
agree with the state courts in approximately one out of every four state court
harmless error determinations.3
When viewed by circuit, however, the numbers show that two circuit
courts, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, account for almost every-case illustrat-
ing a disagreement with a state court's harmless error determination. 34 The
Sixth Circuit disagreed with 8 out of 18 (44.4%) state court determinations
of harmless error,35 and the Ninth Circuit disagreed with 5 out of 30 (16.7%)
state court determinations of harmless error.3 6 Of the remaining 20 circuit
court opinions, only 3 other petitions were granted.37 Over a span of three
and a half years, the Second, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits each disagreed
31with only one state court determination of harmless error.
No circuit court was "flatly unwilling to affirm"" capital convictions
when the state had determined errors harmless.40 In fact, the circuit courts
disagreed with the state courts' findings of harmlessness in capital cases less
remained. Admittedly, I might have missed some cases in which neither the state court opinions that
were available nor the circuit court opinions indicated whether the state court had determined the
alleged errors in the petition were harmless. The sixty-eight cases in the Appendix to this Note rep-
resent the cases that I was able to find using an electronic search database.
30. This survey consisted only of circuit court opinions, primarily because circuit court cases
are more likely to be published and available on electronic databases. Also, I thought that circuit
courts would be more likely to articulate their reasoning and the standard applied when reviewing
state court harmless error determinations. There are also fewer circuit court opinions, which made
the survey more manageable. Finally, this Note discusses a circuit split, and to discuss how circuits
have split one must examine circuit court opinions. There were many district court opinions decided
in the same three and one-half year span, but this Note does not discuss them.
31. See infra app. tbl.1.
32. See id. Percentages were rounded to the nearest tenth.
33. See id.
34. See id. Incidentally, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits also reviewed more state court harmless
error determinations than their sister courts. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. Hearing, supra note 20, at 89 (statement of Ron Eisenberg, Deputy District Attorney,
Philadelphia District Attorney's Office).
40. See infra app. tbl. 1.
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often than in noncapital cases.' Specifically, of 19 cases involving petitions
from capital prisoners in which the state court had determined the errors
harmless, the circuit courts disagreed with the states' assessments only 4
times (21.1%).42 The First, Second, and Third Circuits did not discuss state
court findings of harmless error when reviewing state capital convictions,
but the other circuit courts were willing to agree with state court harmless
error determinations and affirm capital convictions.
Capital Cases Affirming Capital Cases Rejecting
State Court Determination State Court Determination
Circuit of Harmlessness of Harmlessness
4th 2 1
5th 3 0
6th 1 2
7th 0 1
8th 1 0
9th 4 0
10th 4 0
This survey shows that the jurisdiction-stripping provision of section 6
of the proposed Streamlined Procedures Act43 is an ineffective measure. Be-
cause nearly all federal habeas courts already defer to state courts' harmless
error determinations, 4 the provision would have a minor effect on the num-
ber of state court convictions affirmed on collateral review. In three and a
half years, the circuit courts disagreed with only sixteen out of sixty-eight
state court harmless error determinations-including guilt-stage errors and
sentencing errors.45 While the rate of reversals for sentencing errors in capi-
tal cases may have been too high in the past,46 section 6 of the SPA, in
stripping federal habeas jurisdiction only in sentencing decisions,47 would
presently have only a minor effect on this perceived problem.
The SPA's jurisdiction-stripping provision is also inappropriate because
it is a disproportionate response to the practices of only two circuit courts.
Because the Sixth and Ninth Circuits are the only two circuit courts that
disagree with state court determinations with any regularity, 4s stripping all
41. Noncapital cases: 24.5%; capital cases: 21. 1%. See id.
42. See id.
43. Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong. § 6 (2005).
44. See infra app. tbl. 1.
45. See id.
46. See, e.g., Barry Latzer & James N.G. Cauthen, Capital Appeals Revisited, 84 JUDICA-
TURE 64, 64-71 (2000) (finding that from 1990 to 1999, courts reversed in 837 death penalty cases,
328 (39%) of which were conviction reversals and 509 (61%) of which were sentence reversals
only).
47. Streamlined Procedures Act § 6.
48. See infra app. tbl.1.
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federal courts of their jurisdiction amounts to an overcorrection-what some
might call shooting a fly with a cannon. Moreover, while the Sixth and
Ninth Circuit Courts disagreed with state courts' harmless error analyses
more than the other circuit courts, they did agree with state courts' harmless
error determinations more often than not.49 The actual extent of the problem
then is merely that two circuit courts disagree with state court harmless error
determinations less than fifty percent of the time, and the SPA's proposed
solution-stripping every federal court of jurisdiction any time a state court
calls a sentencing error harmless-seems extremely drastic. Moreover, as
Part II explains, the real issue is not that a couple of circuit courts have high
reversal rates, but rather that all federal courts lack a clear and well-defined
standard for conducting habeas review of state court harmless error determi-
nations.
II. How FEDERAL HABEAS COURTS CONDUCT
HARMLESS ERROR REVIEW
The law of harmless error has courts confused because there are two dif-
ferent applicable standards for reviewing a state court's harmless error
determination. First, the Supreme Court announced in Brecht that when
conducting harmless error review, federal habeas courts should apply the
Kotteakos standard,'" which requires that federal habeas courts determine
whether the error "had substantial and injurious effect or influence in deter-
mining the jury's verdict."'" Second, three years after the Supreme Court
handed down Brecht, Congress enacted AEDPA, which amended the federal
habeas corpus statute in part by adding the following:
49. See discussion supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. The Sixth Circuit disagreed
with the state courts' determinations of harmlessness in 44.4% of the cases it heard. The Ninth Cir-
cuit disagreed with the state courts' determinations of harmlessness in 16.7% of the cases it heard.
There are several plausible explanations for the higher reversal rates of the Ninth and Sixth
Circuits. Ninth and Sixth Circuit Court judges may have a lower threshold in determining whether
errors had a substantial and injurious effect. Also, they might be less trusting of the state court
judgments finding errors harmless because many state judges are elected officials who must appear
tough on crime to secure reelection.
Or perhaps the state courts in the Ninth and Sixth Circuits are the reason for the higher rever-
sal rates. The Ninth and Sixth Circuits engaged in harmless error analysis when there was a state
court determination of harmless error more often than any other circuit court. See infra app. tbl. 1.
The state courts in those circuits might be reluctant to grant petitions on state collateral review.
Whereas state courts in other circuits might either grant the petition on state collateral review or
simply find that no error occurred, state courts in the Ninth and Sixth Circuits might be more willing
to find an error has been made, but insulate their convictions from reversal by calling the identified
errors harmless. Consequently, the Ninth and Sixth Circuits might be presented with more cases in
which the state courts' harmless error determinations were objectively unreasonable.
Another plausible explanation for the higher reversal rates of the Ninth and Sixth Circuits is
that the judges on those courts are simply disregarding the law or applying the law improperly.
Perhaps these judges have interpreted the law of harmless error in a manner that allows them to find
errors "not harmless" more often than judges on the other circuit courts.
50. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
51. Id.
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d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in cus-
tody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with
respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court pro-
ceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unrea-
sonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States ......
Interpreting this provision, the Supreme Court held in Williams v. Taylor
that federal courts could no longer merely determine whether the state court
decision had been erroneous; rather, AEDPA required federal courts to grant
habeas relief only when the state court determination had been objectively
unreasonable.5 3 The Court explained that a state court decision is "contrary
to" clearly established Supreme Court law in two instances: when "the state
court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme
Court] on a question of law"; and when "the state court decides a case dif-
ferently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially
indistinguishable facts., 4 An "unreasonable application" of clearly estab-
lished Supreme Court case law would occur when a state court
"identifie[ed] the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme
Court's] decisions but unreasonably applie[ed] that principle to the facts of
[a] prisoner's case."5 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, cautioned
that "a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court
concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision
applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather,
that application must also be unreasonable. 56
The Williams Court stated that "AEDPA plainly sought to ensure a level
of 'deference to the determinations of state courts,' ,.. yet federal habeas
courts remained confused about whether and how AEDPA's deference ap-
plied to state court findings of harmless error.58 In the years following
AEDPA's enactment, federal habeas courts developed distinct approaches to
harmless error review where a state court had made a determination of
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
53. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000).
54. Id. at 412-13.
55. Id. at 413.
56. Id. at411.
57. Id. at 386 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.)).
58. Compare Gutierrez v. McGinnis, 389 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 2004) (declining to apply
Brecht when a state court adjudicated a federal claim on harmless error grounds because habeas
courts are required to evaluate the reasonableness of the state court's application of federal law),
with Webber v. Scott, 390 F.3d 1169, 1177 (10th Cir. 2004) (applying Brecht when the state court
did not apply the Chapman harmless error standard), and Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055,
1059 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a federal habeas court must perform both an AEDPA-based re-
view of the state court's Chapman harmless error analysis and a Brecht harmless error review of the
original error as a precondition to granting habeas relief).
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harmlessness. 9 Whereas some courts continued to apply Brecht without ap-
plying AEDPA, 6° other courts reviewed state court harmless error
determinations under AEDPA's "unreasonable application" standard without
considering whether the error had a "substantial and injurious effect" under
Brecht.61 Still other courts used a combination of the two standards.
61
This Part argues that the Supreme Court should clarify how to apply
Brecht and AEDPA to federal review of state court harmless error determi-
nations because the law is unclear. Section II.A describes each circuit's
stated method for reviewing state court harmless error determinations and
argues that the Supreme Court has failed to establish a clear and uniform
rule. Section II.B explores how the circuit courts have actually conducted
review of state court harmless error determinations and contends that circuit
courts have applied their rules inconsistently. Section II.C argues that the
Supreme Court must clarify the law to limit judicial discretion.
A. How Courts Say Harmless Error Review Should Be Conducted
The circuits have divided on the question of how to review state court
harmless error determinations, and the Supreme Court has not resolved the
resulting uncertainty. This Section reviews the circuit courts' stated methods
for reviewing state court determinations of harmlessness by discussing the
Ninth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit, and the remaining circuits in turn. This Sec-
tion then argues that the Supreme Court's two decisions on the matter have
given inadequate guidance to the lower federal courts.
The Ninth Circuit has not established a unified standard for reviewing
state court harmless error determinations. First, proceeding as if AEDPA
had no effect on federal review of state court harmless error determinations,
63the Ninth Circuit adopted a Brecht-only approach in Bains v. Cambra.
Bains held that "regardless of what, if any, type of harmless error review
was conducted by the state courts,'" 64 the Brecht standard "should apply uni-
formly in all federal habeas corpus cases., 6' Later, in 2004's Medina v.
Hornung, the Ninth Circuit revised its approach and adopted a two-step
analysis.6 6 The court declared that where there is a state determination of
harmlessness, Ninth Circuit courts should first apply AEDPA to "determine
whether the state court's harmless error analysis was objectively unreason-
able.' 67 Then, "if there is a predicate finding that the state court's harmless
59. See generally infra Section H.A.
60. See infra app. tbls. 2-4, group 1.
61. Id., tbls.2-4, group 4.
62. Id., tbls.2-4, groups 2 & 3.
63. 204 F.3d 964, 977 (9th Cir. 2000).
64. Bains, 204 E3d at 977.
65. Id.
66. 372 E3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2004).
67. Medina, 372 F.3d at 1126.
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error analysis was objectively unreasonable, and thus an unreasonable appli-
cation of clearly established federal law," the court should "engage in a
Brecht analysis."6' Subsequently, Medina was superseded by an amended
opinion that did not address the issue of harmless error.69 Consequently,
Ninth Circuit courts have no settled standard regarding the treatment of state
court determinations of harmless error post-AEDPA. 0
The Sixth Circuit also had difficulty establishing a post-AEDPA harm-
less error review standard. In 2001, the Sixth Circuit collapsed AEDPA and
Brecht analyses.7 In Bulls v. Jones, the court stated that "the Brecht test con-
tinues to apply after the enactment of [AEDPA], and that if a habeas
petitioner satisfies the Brecht standard, 'he will surely have demonstrated
that the state court's finding that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt ... resulted from an unreasonable application of Chapman.' ,72 Under
this approach, the result of the Brecht test determined whether the state
court determination of harmlessness was objectively reasonable under
AEDPA. Only two years later, in Passino v. Tessmer, the Sixth Circuit stated
that "the writ [of habeas corpus] will not issue unless the petitioner can es-
tablish that the [state] Court of Appeals's [harmless error] determination was
objectively unreasonable,, 73 which is the AEDPA standard. The court ap-
plied AEDPA only-not Brecht-in reaching this determination. 4 The Sixth
Circuit has mostly followed the rule of Bulls,75 but its articulation of the cir-
cuit rule has been inconsistent,
Although the other circuit courts have not settled on a single approach,
they have succeeded in establishing a clear rule within their respective juris-
dictions. In Zappulla v. New York, the Second Circuit conducted only
AEDPA analysis, 76 and in a later case it specifically articulated that federal
habeas courts should only evaluate whether the state unreasonably applied
federal law-an AEDPA-only approach.77 The Eighth Circuit expressed
68. Id.
69. Medina v. Homung, 386 F.3d 872 (9th Cir. 2004) (amending and superseding Medina,
372 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2004)). Superseded opinions are void. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1479
(8th ed. 2004) ("supersede, vb. 1. To annul, make void, or repeal by taking the place of <the 1996
statute supersedes the 1989 act>.").
70. Gutierrez v. McGinnis, 389 F. 3d 300, 304-05 n.3 (2d Cir. 20004) ("The Ninth Circuit
initially adopted this approach in Medina v. Hornung, 372 F.3d 1120, 1125-27 (9th Cir.2004), but
later superseded the relevant analysis by an amended opinion that did not address the issue.").
71. Bulls v. Jones, 274 F.3d 329, 335 (6th Cir. 2001).
72. Id. (quoting Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352, 371-72 (6th Cir. 1999)).
73. Passino v. Tessmer, 61 F. App'x 124, 127 (6th Cir. 2003).
74. See id.
75. See infra app. tbl.3, groups 1 & 2.
76. 391 F.3d 462, 467 (2d Cir. 2004).
77. Gutierrez v. McGinnis, 389 F3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Mitchell [v. Esparza, 540 U.S.
12 (2003)] signals, and we therefore hold, that when a state court explicitly conducts harmless error
review of a constitutional error, a habeas court must evaluate whether the state unreasonably applied
Chapman.").
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doubt as to whether Brecht survived AEDPA7 ' and has subsequently em-
ployed an AEDPA-only approach. 9 The Fourth Circuit established a two-
step test, first evaluating whether the state court had unreasonably applied
Chapman, and then further assessing the underlying error under Brecht.s°
The Seventh Circuit established the same two-step test in 2003; however, the
court did not require that the steps be applied in a particular order.8 ' Finally,
the First, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have each held that Brecht is the sole
82
standard required .
Even though the circuit split made the issue ripe for clarification, the
Supreme Court has not yet provided clear guidance. Indeed, the Court's two
post-AEDPA decisions may have added to the confusion by employing one
standard in Early v. Packer"3 and a seemingly different standard in Mitchell
v. Esparza.s4 In Early, the Supreme Court reviewed a state court harmless
error determination by first analyzing the state court's determination under
AEDPA and then conducting a Brecht analysis. 5 The Court explicitly re-
jected the Brecht-only analysis86 and clarified that a Brecht analysis was
proper only where the federal court "first found (pursuant to the correct
standard) that the [state] court's decision was 'contrary to' clearly estab-
lished Supreme Court law."'87
The Court appears to have applied a different standard only a year later.
In Mitchell v. Esparza, the Court held that an Ohio Court of Appeals deci-
sion, affirming a death sentence, was neither "contrary to" nor an
"unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law, and there be-
gan and ended its harmless error analysis." The Court, per the two-part test
set out in Early, could have ended its analysis before discussing the Brecht
78. Whitmore v. Kemna, 213 F.3d 431, 433 (8th Cir. 2000) ("We are not convinced that the
AEDPA did not abrogate the requirement that federal habeas courts conduct a harmless error analy-
sis under Brecht in situations such as the one before us, where the state court already has conducted
a Chapman harmless error analysis, that is, where the claim has been 'adjudicated on the merits' in
state court. It seems to us that § 2254(d) as amended by the AEDPA is unambiguous as to the scope
of federal court review, limiting such review (at least as compared with past practice) in order to
effect the intent of Congress to expedite habeas proceedings with appropriate deference to state
court determinations.").
79. Brown v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 458, 469 (8th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
80. Allen v. Lee, 366 F.3d 319, 336-37, 342-44 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (plurality opinion)
(two concurrences applying two-step approach).
81. Aleman v. Stemes, 320 F.3d 687, 690-91 (7th Cir. 2003) (endorsing two stage inquiry,
but not requiring judges to follow particular sequence in applying standards on habeas review).
82. Robertson v. Cain, 324 F.3d 297, 306-07 (5th Cir. 2003); Herrera v. Lemaster, 301 F.3d
1192, 1200 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Sanna v. Dipaolo, 265 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2001).
83. 537 U.S. 3, 10 (2002).
84. 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003).
85. Early, 537 U.S. at 10.
86. Id. at 11.
87. Id. at 10-11.
88. Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 18.
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prong, but Mitchell made no mention of Brecht.9 Because Mitchell did not
explicitly overrule Brecht, lower courts disagree on whether Mitchell implic-
itly rejected the Brecht analysis.90 Where there is a state court determination
of harmlessness, Mitchell may have implicitly adopted an AEDPA-only ap-
proach to examining the harmlessness of errors on collateral review.9,
The Court's two opinions discussing this issue provide inadequate guid-
ance to the lower federal courts. First, Early's discussion of harmless error
review is arguably dicta.92 In Early, the Court noted that the circuit court
should not have conducted harmless error review in that case because there
had been, in its view, no error.93 If there had been no error, then the harm-
lessness of an error was not at issue, and the opinion's commentary on
harmless error was unnecessary and therefore dicta. Second, Mitchell did
not explicitly hold anything with respect to the relationship between AEDPA
and Brecht; rather, the court merely conducted AEDPA analysis without
applying the Brecht standard.94 The Court did not specifically address
whether all courts should thereafter conduct only AEDPA analysis in similar
situations.95
Despite the lapse of over ten years since AEDPA's enactment,
96
AEDPA's relationship with Brecht remains unclear in part because the Su-
preme Court has failed to establish a clear test and has instead confused the
lower courts.
89. Id.
90. Compare Zappulla v. New York, 391 F.3d 462, 467-75 (2d Cir. 2004) ("We follow, as we
must, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Mitchell to hold that, in reviewing a state court's harmless
error determination, we only may reverse determinations that are objectively unreasonable."),
Gutierrez v. McGinnis, 389 F.3d 300, 306 (2d Cir. 2004) ("In its recent decision of Mitchell v.
Esparza... [,] however, the Supreme Court implicitly rejected Brecht as the proper lens for examin-
ing the harmlessness of constitutional errors on collateral review, at least where the state explicitly
adjudicated a federal claim on harmless error grounds.") (citations omitted), and Nguyen v.
McGrath, 323 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2004) ("More recently, in Esparza, the Supreme
Court seemed to hold that, instead of independently applying Brecht, federal courts should apply the
objective unreasonableness test to a state appellate court's application of Chapman.") with Inthavong
v. Lamarque, 420 E3d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Admittedly the Second Circuit has done away
with the Brecht standard in light of AEDPA and Esparza, and the Eighth Circuit has at least ques-
tioned Brecht's continued vitality. We, however, have squarely held that the Brecht standard survived
AEDPA." (citation omitted)), and Picazo v. Alameida, 366 F.3d 971, 971 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Given
that Esparza did not even mention Brecht, or its progeny [,J ... we do not believe that the [Su-
preme] Court intended to overrule those earlier decisions." (citations omitted)).
91. See Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 18; see also 6 LAFAVE, ISRAEL, & KING, supra note 5, § 28.3(f)
(2d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2006) ("An alternative position is that when reviewing a case in which the
state court explicitly conducted harmless error review of a constitutional error, federal courts must
review whether or not the state court's decision was 'contrary to, or involved an unreasonable appli-
cation of' Chapman, an approach that appears to be supported by the Court's analysis in Mitchell v.
Esparza." (citations omitted)).
92. See Early, 537 U.S. at 10-11.
93. Seeid. at 11.
94. See Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 18.
95. See id.
96. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000)).
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B. How Circuit Courts Actually Conduct Harmless Error Review
Since AEDPA was enacted, federal habeas courts' review of state court
harmless error determinations has been somewhat erratic.97 This Section
shows that some circuit courts have inconsistently applied the law of harm-
less error review of their respective circuits. The discussion organizes the
opinions of the circuit courts into four distinct groups based on the reasons
stated for finding an error harmless or not and the description of the test
applied.98
Group 1 comprises cases in which courts simply applied Brecht, as
though AEDPA's "contrary to" and "unreasonable application of clearly es-
tablished Federal law" clause did not apply to harmless error review.99 For
example, in Blakeley v. Terhune,1 °° the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
"failure to give the 'imperfect self-defense' pinpoint instruction to the
charge of involuntary manslaughter" did not clearly result "in prejudice to
the petitioner by 'ha[ving] a substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury's verdict.' ,,... Finding that Brecht was not satisfied, the
court ended its analysis without mentioning whether AEDPA also applied,
or even citing AEDPA.1 2 The First, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits have en-
dorsed-but not necessarily followed'n-the Brecht-only approach used in
the opinions in Group L 4
97. See infra app., tbls.2-4.
98. The following discussion of the application of harmless error review separates the opin-
ions of the circuit courts into four groups. Although the discussion may employ the word
"approach" to describe how a court conducted harmless error review in a particular opinion, the
reader should not assume that an opinion classified under Group I necessarily contains an applica-
tion of harmless error review that is wholly distinct from the review employed by an opinion
classified under Group 2.
In some cases, the court employed a two-part test, and, finding the petitioner failed to satisfy
the first part of the test, the court declined to conduct the second part of the test. The court that
reaches only the first part of a two-part test is not conducting a different test than a court that
reaches both parts of the two-part test. Most opinions, however, do not indicate which test they are
using, whether one-part, two-part, or twelve-part. The opinions usually do not indicate whether the
court skipped the second part of a test. Instead, courts often simply declared that the error was harm-
less or not harmless for one reason or another, without indicating the framework applied to come to
that determination. It is often impossible to tell which test the court applied.
Therefore, the following discussion will categorize opinions in different groups according to
how an error was determined to be harmless or non-harmless. No attempt was made to guess at what
a given court would have done-whether the court would have applied the second part of a test had
it not made the determination it did under the first part of the test. The reasoning that the court actu-
ally explained and the tests that the court actually conducted in the opinion determine an opinion's
classification.
99. See infra app. tbls.2-4, group 1.
100. 126 F. App'x 396 (9th Cir. 2005).
101. Id. at 398-99 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993)).
102. See id. at 399.
103. For examples of when these circuit courts did not follow the Group 1 approach, see the
Appendix to this Note, Table 4, Groups 2-4.
104. Robertson v. Cain, 324 F.3d 297, 306-07 (5th Cir. 2003); Herrera v. Lemaster, 301 F.3d
1192, 1200 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Sanna v. DiPaolo, 265 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2001).
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In Group 2 cases, the result of the application of Brecht determined
whether the state court determination was objectively reasonable under
AEDPA.' ' If the circuit court found an error harmless under Brecht, it
automatically declared that the state court's determination of harnlessness
was not objectively unreasonable under AEDPA.'06 If it found the error non-
harmless under Brecht, the circuit court concluded that the state court's de-
termination of harmlessness was therefore objectively unreasonable under
AEDPA. °7 In Bell v. Hurley, where "[t]he same judge who presided over
[the petitioner's] trial ... denied [his] post-conviction motion to vacate his
conviction," the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit concluded that the
state court's determination was neither contrary to clearly established Su-
preme Court precedent nor an unreasonable application of that precedent
because the error did not have a substantial and injurious effect under
Brecht.00 Essentially, the approach applied to cases in Group 2 is identical to
the approach applied to cases in Group 1. The Group 2 approach somewhat
diminishes AEDPA's independent relevance because a state court's harmless
error analysis is an unreasonable application of clearly established law if,
and only if, the federal habeas court determines that the error in question
had a "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's
verdict. ' 09
The opinions in which a circuit court applied only AEDPA without men-
tioning Brecht fall under Group 3."0 Perhaps because these courts interpret
AEDPA as having eliminated the need for Brecht, these opinions did not cite
Brecht or discuss whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect."'
The courts merely determined whether the state courts' determinations of
harmlessness were objectively unreasonable and thereupon ended their
analyses." 2 For example, in Brown v. Luebbers, the Eighth Circuit noted that
the state court had determined that the exclusion of a witness's testimony
was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" under Chapman."' After review-
ing the facts of the case, the court held that the state court's determination of
harmlessness "was sufficient adjudication on the merits to entitle this [...]
holding to AEDPA deferential review."" 4 The Eighth Circuit did not cite
105. See infra app. tbls.2-4, group 2.
106. E.g., Isasi v. Herbert, 176 E App'x 143, 145 (2d Cir. 2006); Diaz v. Hickman, 101 F.
App'x 726, 727 (9th Cir. 2004); McNeil v. Castro, 81 F. App'x 901,902 (9th Cir. 2003).
107. E.g., Ben-Yisrayl v. Davis, 431 F.3d 1043, 1051-53 (7th Cir. 2005); Ruimveld v. Birkett,
404 F.3d 1006, 1012-18 (6th Cir. 2005).
108. 97 F. App'x I1, 15, 17 (6th Cir. 2004).
109. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
110. See infra app. tbls.2-4, group 3.
111. See, e.g., Zappulla v. New York, 391 F.3d 462,467-75 (2d Cir. 2004).
112. E.g., Hamilton v. Mullin, 436 F.3d 1181, 1187-97 (10th Cir. 2006).
113. 371 F.3d 458, 462-63 (8th Cir. 2004).
114. Luebbers, 371 F.3d at 463.
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Brecht or conduct any further review to determine whether the error had a
"substantial and injurious effect.""'
Group 4 comprises cases in which circuit courts first applied AEDPA to
determine whether a state court's application of Chapman was objectively
unreasonable.1 6 When the circuit courts found a state court's determination
unreasonable under AEDPA, they applied Brecht in de novo review.' '7 For
example, in Jones v. Polk, the Fourth Circuit first determined that the state
court had unreasonably applied Chapman, then reviewed the claim de novo
and determined that under Brecht the error was harmless."
NUMBER OF OPINIONS IN EACH GROUP BY CIRCUIT
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
Ist Circuit 0 0 0 1
2d Circuit 0 1 2 0
3d Circuit 2 0 0 0
4th Circuit 1 0 0 2
5th Circuit 2 1 0 0
6th Circuit 7 8 2 1
7th Circuit 1 1 0 0
8th Circuit 0 0 1 0
9th Circuit 13 4 5 8
10th Circuit 2 0 3 0
Organized into these groups, the patterns of each circuit court become
apparent. Table 2 shows that the Ninth Circuit has not followed its own rules
on harmless error review." 9 The court deviated at least five times following
the establishment of the Bains v. Cambra approach (Group 1), '20 which the
Ninth Circuit announced in 2000, clarifying that harmless error review
should consist only of Brecht analysis, regardless of whether the state court
115. Id.
116. See infra app. tbls.2-4, group 4. Some opinions in Group 3 might not have differed
greatly from the opinions in Group 4. Arguably, an opinion that ostensibly employed an AEDPA-
only approach might actually have applied the first part of a Group 4 two-step approach, where,
finding the case failing under the first step (AEDPA), the court declined to review the error under
the second step (Brecht). The opinions in Group 3, however, did not indicate a two-step application,
whereas the opinions in Group 4 contain language that explicitly described the approach as having
two steps.
117. See infra app. tbls.2-4, group 4.
118. Jones v. Polk, 401 F.3d 257, 264-65 (4th Cir. 2005).
119. See infra app. tbl. 2.
120. See Johnson v. Garcia, 80 F App'x 599, 600 (9th Cir. 2003); Paulinkonis v. Ryder, 82 F.
App'x 514, 518-19 (9th Cir. 2003); McNeil v. Castro, 81 F. App'x 901,902 (9th Cir. 2003); Marti-
nez v. Castro, 77 F. App'x 403, 403-04 (9th Cir. 2003); Dao v. Terhune, 57 F. App'x 779, 779-80
(9th Cir. 2003). The Ninth Circuit decided these cases after it announced the Bains rule, yet these
cases do not follow the Bains rule.
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found harmless error.'2' The court's two-step Medina v. Hornung analysis
(Group 4), announced in 2004, combined the AEDPA and Brecht analyses, '
but it was used a mere three times after its pronouncement. 123 Most often the
Ninth Circuit simply applied Brecht (Group 1).'z' The Ninth Circuit utilized
the approach of Group 1 in nearly all of the cases that reversed the state
court determination of harmlessness, although that tendency does not war-
rant a causal inference.' Whenever AEDPA's deference was independently
applied, however, the Court agreed with the state court determination of
harmless error.
126
Despite its declaration of a unified approach in Bulls, 12 the Sixth Cir-
cuit's opinions fall into all four groups.12 Most often, however, the court did
follow the Bulls rule, and, consequently, 8 of the 18 cases from the Sixth
Circuit fall under Group 2."9 Furthermore, 7 of the other Sixth Circuit opin-
ions compose Group 1, the Brecht-only approach, which is practically
identical to the Bulls rule. 3 ° Unlike the Ninth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit did
disagree with state court harmless error determinations using the approaches
of Groups 1 through 3.131 In the Sixth Circuit, none of the approaches pro-
duced a substantially higher rate of disagreement with state courts.1
32
Some other circuit courts also failed to follow their rules. Although the
Tenth Circuit stated that it would apply a Brecht-only standard,' it applied
121. Bains v. Cambra, 204 E3d 964, 977 (9th Cir. 2000). Specifically, the Bains court said
that harmless error review of state court convictions, whether there was a determination of harm-
lessness by the state court or not, should uniformly consist of the application of Brecht. Id. The court
made it clear that harmless error review would be the same if there was a state court determination
of harmlessness (where AEDPA could apply) or not (where AEDPA could not apply). Thus, the
court mandated a Brecht-only approach where there was a state court determination of harmlessness.
122. Medina v. Hornung, 372 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2004).
123. See infra app. tbl. 2; Earle v. Runnels, 176 F. App'x 883, 886 (9th Cir. 2006); Villescas v.
Hernandez, 163 F App'x 612, 613-14 (9th Cir. 2006); Earp v. Stokes, 149 F App'x 607, 609-612
(9th Cir. 2005).
124. See infra app. tbl.2. The Ninth Circuit applied the Brecht-only standard in 13 out of 30
cases, or 43.3%.
125. See infra app. tbl.2. Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F.3d 993, 1007-09 (9th Cir. 2005), which
utilized the approach of Group 2, provides an exception to this trend.
126. See infra app. tbl.2.
127. Bulls v. Jones, 274 E3d 329, 335 (6th Cir. 2001).
128. See infra app. tbl.3.
129. Id.
130. As discussed, supra note 98, the distinction between the approach used in the cases
categorized in Group 1 and the approach used by the cases categorized in Group 2 is tenuous. Be-
cause the Bulls rule combines AEDPA analysis with the Brecht standard, a court that applies only
Brecht is conducting a review that is essentially identical to that of a court that applies Brecht and
uses the result to determine the outcome of an AEDPA analysis.
131. See infra app. tbl.3.
132. See id.
133. Herrera v. Lemaster, 301 F.3d 1192, 1200 (10th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
February 2007]
Michigan Law Review
the AEDPA-only standard three times.' The First Circuit has applied the
two-step approach used by courts in Group 4,135 even though it declared in
2001 that it would apply a Brecht-only approach.1 6 The Fourth Circuit es-
tablished the Group 4 two-step test in 2004,' but applied a Brecht-only test
in 2005.38 The Second Circuit declared that it would adhere to the AEDPA-
only standard, 9 but applied the two-step approach of Group 2 in one case.
4
0
C. The Current State of Harmless Error Analysis Is Not Harmless
The application of harmless error in federal habeas cases has been in-
consistent. This Section argues for a clarification of the law.
The reason for the circuit courts' high rate of disagreement with the state
courts is largely that the law has not settled since AEDPA's enactment-not
necessarily that federal courts are unwilling to let state court convictions
stand. The law is unclear, and the differences among the various standards
are not apparent to many courts.' 41 In fact, judges deciding which approach
to use sometimes remark that, because the outcome would be the same un-
der any of the standards, which particular standard is applied is not
important. 42 For example, in idwell v. Calderon, the Ninth Circuit dis-
cussed the Supreme Court's use of AEDPA in Mitchell v. Esparza'4 ' and the
approaches used in other Ninth Circuit cases' that only analyzed state court
decisions under Brecht145 The court then stated, "As the result in this case
would be the same under either analysis, we do not pursue this enigma fur-
134. Hamilton v. Mullin, 436 E3d 1181, 1187-97 (10th Cir. 2006); Malicoat v. Mullin, 426
F.3d 1241, 1247, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 2005); Spears v. Mullin, 343 F.3d 1215, 1232-33 (10th Cir.
2003).
135. Petrillo v. O'Neill, 428 F.3d 41, 44-45 (lst Cir. 2005).
136. Sanna v. DiPaolo, 265 F.3d 1, 14 (lst Cir. 2001).
137. Allen v. Lee, 366 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
138. Simpson v. Polk, 129 F App'x 782 (4th Cir. 2005).
139. Zappulla v. New York, 391 F.3d 462, 467-75 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying AEDPA without
applying Brecht).
140. Isasi v. Herbert, 176 F. App'x 143, 145 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying a two-step analysis).
141. See, e.g., Belmontes v. Brown, 414 F.3d 1094, 1139 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Regardless of the
applicable rule, we are convinced that the instructional error in this case, which prevented the jury
from considering and giving effect to Belmontes' most important mitigation evidence, had a sub-
stantial and injurious effect on the jury's verdict."); Tidwell v. Calderon, 134 F. App'x 141, 143 n.3
(9th Cir. 2005) ("As the result in this case would be the same under either analysis, we do not pursue
this enigma further."); Benn v. Greiner, 402 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Because these standards
all produce the same result in this case, we do not resolve that open question here."); Rosa v.
McCray, 396 F.3d 210, 226 (2d Cir. 2005) ("I do not resolve which of the possible harmless error
tests apply, because I think under any of tests the constitutional error was not harmless.").
142. See supra note 141.
143. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 18 (2003).
144. Medina v. Horung, 386 F.3d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 2004); Picazo v. Alameida, 366 F.3d
971, 971 (9th Cir. 2004).
145. 7idwell, 134 F. App'x at 143 n.3.
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ther."' 46 In Murden v. Artuz, the Second Circuit questioned whether state
harmless error determinations should be reviewed under Brecht or AEDPA
and concluded with minimal discussion that it did not need to "decide this
issue here because any possible error in this case was harmless under either
of the standards."'' 47 With the law of harmless error in such a state of dis-
combobulation, judges essentially have free rein to apply any of the four
standards or no standard at all.
Because the unsettled state of the law allows judges the freedom to dis-
regard state court harmless error determinations, the Supreme Court must
issue a clear directive. Without a clear dictate from the Supreme Court,
judges might listen only to the commands of their consciences when calling
errors harmless. The potential for arbitrary decision-making might be great
enough to warrant the fears that federal judges will second-guess and "un-
dercut the 'finality' of state [court) judgments"'' 48 only because they are last
in the habeas corpus lineup. It is not necessary, however, to infer bad faith,
or even disrespect for the law. The law is unclear. A clarification from the
Supreme Court would constrain judges by imposing a unified rational ap-
proach.
The question remains, which approach should the Court adopt? Part III
discusses each option and argues that the proper solution is the approach
used by the courts in Group 2: applying Brecht and using the result of the
Brecht analysis to determine whether the state court harmless error determi-
nation is an unreasonable application under AEDPA.
III. GROUP 2 HAS IT RIGHT
The possible choices for reviewing an error's harmlessness can be
viewed as points on a spectrum. At one end sits the Chapman standard,
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,"' 49 which, in theory, should result in
the fewest errors dismissed as harmless and the most petitions granted on
federal habeas review. Chapman's standard is considered to be the most pe-
titioner-friendly standard"" because it requires the state to carry our legal
system's most onerous burden. 5' At the other end of the spectrum is section
6 of the proposed Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, or a like rule, which
146. Id.
147. 60 F. App'x 344, 347 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003).
148. Yackle, supra note 25, at 1010 (quoting Bator, supra note 25).
149. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
150. See Gutierrez v. McGinnis, 389 F.3d 300, 305 (2d Cir. 2004) ("On direct review, Chap-
man is considerably more generous to prejudiced defendants than is Brecht."); Brent E. Newton, A
Primer on Post-Conviction Habeas Corpus Review, CHAMPION, June 2005, at 16, 18 ("[O]n federal
habeas corpus review, this Chapman standard generally is inapplicable and, instead, a habeas peti-
tioner faces a considerably less favorable harmless-error standard .... [T]he Brecht standard places
a lower burden on the prosecution to show that the error did not have a 'substantial and injurious
effect' on the verdict or sentence." (citation omitted)).
151. See United States v. Hernandez, 176 F.3d 719, 738 (3d Cir. 1999) ("[B]eyond a reason-
able doubt is the highest burden we have in our system of justice.").
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would strip federal habeas courts of jurisdiction for sentencing errors that
the state courts have determined to be harmless.'52 If their jurisdiction were
stripped, federal habeas courts would grant no petitions in cases in which
the state called sentencing errors harmless. The various combinations and
sequences of Brecht and AEDPA described in Part II fall between the two
extremes.
This Part will consider the merits of each approach. Section III.A dis-
cusses the Chapman standard, which the Supreme Court appropriately
rejected. Section III.B addresses Congress's proposed solution to the prob-
lem: jurisdiction stripping. Section III.C discusses the approaches currently
used by federal habeas courts and argues that the approach used in the opin-
ions in Group 2, where Brecht is incorporated into AEDPA's analysis, is the
best approach.
A. Chapman's "Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt"
The standard from Chapman v. California, which requires courts to de-
termine whether the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,"'53 was
rejected by the Supreme Court' 5 and is inappropriate for federal habeas re-
view. In Brecht, the Court rejected the Chapman standard because
"collateral review is different from direct review,'"'55 and "'an error that may
justify reversal on direct appeal will not necessarily support a collateral at-
tack on a final judgment.' ,,156 Brecht's majority opined that "state courts
often occupy a superior vantage point from which to evaluate the effect of
trial error,"'57 and that the costs of the additional time and resources neces-
sary to relitigate criminal trials would outweigh any deterrent effect on state
courts to be derived from the use of Chapman.'
The Supreme Court's reasons for rejecting Chapman are still relevant
today. Although Justice O'Connor, in dissent, worried that the application of
any standard other than Chapman might undermine "our faith in the reliabil-
ity of the criminal process,"' 59 society's confidence in the trustworthiness of
convictions can be preserved with a less petitioner-friendly standard than
Chapman. Moreover, the soundness of applying the same standard on fed-
eral habeas as on direct review must be questioned. By the time a federal
habeas court reviews a petition from a state prisoner, the case has been tried
152. Streamlined Procedures Act of 2005, S. 1088, 109th Cong. § 6 (2005).
153. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
154. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 630 (1993).
155. Id. at 633.
156. Id. at 634 (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982)).
157. Id. at 636.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 650 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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and its harmlessness reviewed under Chapman by up to five courts.' 6 The
interests of comity aside, 6 1 one begins to wonder how many courts must
review the degree of an error's harm. Federal habeas review should not be a
forum to relitigate the same issues under the same standards for the sixth
time. Because the trial and direct appeal from the trial should be the focus of
the criminal process, Brecht correctly recognized that federal habeas relief
should be an extraordinary remedy. Because the application of Chapman
on federal habeas review would make habeas relief less extraordinary,
Chapman should not apply on federal habeas review.
B. Jurisdiction Stripping
The other extreme, stripping federal habeas courts of jurisdiction when a
state has determined that any error was harmless, is an even less appropriate
solution. While this would undoubtedly eliminate the confusion surrounding
the law of harmless error, it would also significantly reduce the opportunity
for federal courts to weigh in on state court application and interpretation of
federal law. "[T]here is a national interest in the correct and uniform inter-
pretation of federal law,"' but federal courts might never hear many
criminal federal-law claims if Congress limits or eliminates federal habeas
jurisdiction. The interpretation of federal law would be left to state courts
and the Supreme Court of the United States-in the few cases in which the
Supreme Court actually grants the writ of certiorari on direct review.
160. A state prisoner is convicted in trial court, and direct appeal is heard by up to two courts,
the intermediate appellate court and the state high court. If the appeal is denied at all levels, then the
prisoner must go through state collateral review, See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(l)(A) (2000). Often, up to
three more state courts will hear the prisoner's case. 39 Am. JUR. 2D Habeas Corpus § 24 (1999).
161. Many Supreme Court decisions dealing with habeas corpus focus on the states' comity
interests. See, e.g., Brecht, 507 U.S. at 635 ("The reason most frequently advanced in our cases for
distinguishing between direct and collateral review is the State's interest in the finality of convic-
tions that have survived direct review within the state court system. We have also spoken of comity
and federalism." (citations omitted)); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491 (1991) ("Finality has
special importance in the context of a federal attack on a state conviction .... Our federal system
recognizes the independent power of a State to articulate societal norms through criminal law; but
the power of a State to pass laws means little if the State cannot enforce them." (citations omitted));
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("'[Tlhe Court never has defined the
scope of the writ simply by reference to a perceived need to assure that an individual accused of
crime is afforded a trial free of constitutional error.' Rather, we have recognized that interests of
comity and finality must also be considered in determining the proper scope of habeas review."
(alteration in original) (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 447 (1986) (plurality opinion))).
162. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90 (1977) (noting the importance of the "percep-
tion of the trial of a criminal case in state court as a decisive and portentous event").
163. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 633-34 ("[T]he writ of habeas corpus has historically been regarded
as an extraordinary remedy ....").
164. Yackle, supra note 25, at 1022; see also Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304, 347-48 (1816) (propounding the importance of correct and uniform federal law and "the im-
portance, and even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all
subjects within the purview of the constitution" (emphasis omitted)).
165. See John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 573, 598 (2006) ("The Supreme
Court currently hears between seventy and eighty-five cases per year, while about 60,000 cases a
year are filed in the courts of appeal and about 325,000 cases are filed a year in the district courts.")
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Further, petitioners in state custody would not have their federal law and
constitutional claims heard by a federal court and would therefore have no
opportunity to obtain "a sympathetic forum in which their federal claims
[could] be addressed by independent judges familiar with relevant princi-
ples."' 66 If Congress stripped federal habeas jurisdiction, the same state
courts that convicted the petitioner and affirmed his conviction might also
conduct his collateral review.
167
Critics argue that Congress should further cabin federal habeas jurisdic-
tion because the victims of crime have an interest in the finality of
convictions, 16s but victims' interests should not compel lawmakers to com-
promise the accuracy of our system of justice. Although courts often
consider the state's and victims' interest in the finality of convictions, 61 they
need not weigh finality so heavily. Some crime victims do suffer through the
rehashing of the crime at each stage of collateral review, 70 but the victims'
need for finality must be weighed against the accused's need for fairness
and society's need to bring the right person to justice. 17' Accuracy and fun-
damental fairness are the foundations of our criminal justice system."
(citing OFFICE OF JUDGES PROGRAMS, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2003, at 6, http:/l www.uscourts.gov/caseload2003/front/
Mar03Txt.pdf); see also Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 827 n.6 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction "cannot even come
close to 'doing the whole job'" of "correct[ing] erroneous state-court decisions and ... insur[ing]
that federal law is interpreted and applied uniformly"). Admittedly, if federal habeas jurisdiction
were reduced, the Supreme Court of the United States might take more cases on direct review from
high courts of the states.
166. Yackle, supra note 25, at 1022.
167. See, e.g., Bell v. Hurley, 97 E App'x 11, 15 (6th Cir. 2004) ("The same judge who pre-
sided over Bell's trial, however, denied Bell's post-conviction motion to vacate his conviction.").
168. Hearing, supra note 20, at 91 (statement of Ron Eisenberg, Deputy District Attorney,
Philadelphia District Attorney's Office) ("The truth is that, whether or not they actually reverse a
conviction, federal habeas courts drag out litigation for years of utterly unjustifiable delay, creating
exorbitant costs for the state and endless pain for the victims.").
169. See, e.g., Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 539 (1998) ("A State's finality interests
are compelling when a federal court of appeals issues a mandate denying federal habeas relief. Only
with an assurance of real finality can the State execute its moral judgment and can victims of crime
move forward knowing the moral judgment will be carried out."); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324
(1995) ("As we have stated, the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception seeks to balance the
societal interests in finality, comity, and conservation of scarce judicial resources with the individual
interest in justice that arises in the extraordinary case.").
170. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Prosecutors See Limits to Doubt in Capital Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 24, 2003, at Al ("Conversations with victims' families about these [DNA] motions are not easy
for prosecutors . .. . 'Every Prosecutor dreads making a phone call to a victim after the victim
thinks the case is over . ... You're reopening the wound.' ") (quoting Joshua Marquis, National
District Attorneys Association).
171. Cf Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 259 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Although a
State undoubtedly possesses a legitimate interest in the finality of its convictions, when the State
itself undermines the accuracy of a capital proceeding, that general interest must give way to the
demands of justice.").
172. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 73 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("It still re-
mains 'a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent
man than to let a guilty man go free."' (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
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Meaningful federal habeas review is important for ensuring that the system
punishes only the guilty, and without it the criminal system, which can take
away liberty and life, is less measured and more unjust.
C. The Muddled Middle
The remaining rules must be considered on theoretical grounds because
they differ little in their practical application. It is difficult to imagine which
standard will be the most or least petitioner-friendly in practice. In fact,
none of the standards has proved universally more petitioner-friendly than
the others. For example, as explained above, since the beginning of 2003 the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has granted petitions most often
when it has applied the Brecht-only standard of Group 1."' One might con-
jecture that the application of the Brecht-only standard would result in more
grants of habeas relief than the application of other standards, but the Sixth
Circuit has granted habeas relief using almost every combination of Brecht
and AEDPA.174 Moreover, the rest of the circuits only granted petitions when
they applied a standard other than the Brecht-only standard. 7 5 Intuition
might lead jurists and commentators to think that a Brecht-only standard-
"substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's ver-
dict"-would be easier for petitioners to meet than AEDPA's requirement
that the state court's determination was objectively unreasonable. The prac-
tical application of the rules, however, has produced a counterintuitive
result.176
Two of the approaches discussed in Part II can be dismissed immedi-
ately. The approach used in the opinions in Group 1, Brecht-only, and the
approach used by the opinions in Group 3, AEDPA-only, utilize only one of
the two extant binding standards, and therefore neither seems appropriate. A
Brecht-only standard of review ignores Congress's command under AEDPA
that federal courts defer to the state court's rulings. Moreover, because the
Supreme Court did not apply Brecht in Mitchell, 7  a Brecht-only standard
must be incorrect. On the other hand, even though the Mitchell court only
applied AEDPA17 8 an AEDPA-only approach would overrule Brecht, and the
Supreme Court has yet to do So. 79 Congress might have tried to overrule
Brecht by passing AEDPA, but the Supreme Court has implied that Brecht
concurring))); United States v. Lipowski, 423 F. Supp. 864, 866 (D.N.J. 1976) ("[Flundamental
fairness.., is the foundation of our judicial system.").
173. See infra app. tbl.2.
174. See id. tbl.3.
175. See id. tbl.4.
176. See id. tbls.2-4.
177. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17-18 (2003).
178. Id. As discussed above, the Mitchell court might not have applied Brecht because it did
not reach the second stage of the AEDPA-then-Brecht test of Group 4.
179. See supra notes 83-96 and accompanying text. As mentioned above, some circuit courts
have acted as if Mitchell v. Esparza overruled Brecht, but the Court did not explicitly state that
Brecht was overruled. Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 17-18.
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survived after Congress enacted AEDPA."8 Choosing either AEDPA or
Brecht necessarily means that one rule is disregarded. Because both stan-
dards appear to be binding, the approaches used by Groups 1 and 3 must be
incorrect.
The Supreme Court should not adopt the approach utilized in the opin-
ions in Group 4, applying AEDPA and then applying Brecht, because this
approach excessively inhibits federal courts' power to grant habeas relief.
Group 4 courts, which require an error to be harmless under first AEDPA
then Brecht, will have two chances and two separate standards under which
they can call errors harmless. Federal courts may deem harmless not only
errors that did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the jury's de-
termination of the verdict, but also errors that state courts deemed harmless
in a manner that was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of cur-
rent federal law. Applying two standards would theoretically tend to result in
more errors being called harmless than if only one standard were applied,
and consequently federal courts could reverse convictions in a meager num-
ber of cases. Federal habeas relief should only be granted in extraordinary
circumstances, but it should not be next to impossible to obtain."'
Moreover, Group 4's approach would diminish the important individual
protections provided by the federal forum. While the AEDPA-then-Brecht
standard would allow the state court's judgment to stand more often and
settle cases at an earlier stage, it would also foreclose the opportunity for a
state prisoner to have her case reviewed by an independent and unbiased
federal judge. 182 This approach would significantly diminish the opportunity
for innocent individuals to have their convictions overturned, because in
many cases the approach would effectively remove the federal courts as a
• /. . • 183
meaningful safeguard against the conviction of innocent individuals.
Without a meaningful federal check on state court convictions, the public
could lose confidence in the accuracy of criminal convictions 84
180. In Early, the Supreme Court applied Brecht post-AEDPA. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 10
(2002). However, no Supreme Court case has directly answered the question of whether AEDPA
overruled Brecht, and the Supreme Court could still hold that AEDPA did in fact overrule Brecht.
181. See infra app. tbls.2-4 (showing that in this survey only one federal court disagreed with
the state court determination when the approach of Group 4 was applied).
182. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (noting that state prisoners with consti-
tutional claims are entitled to have a federal habeas court make an independent determination,
without regard to the state courts' determinations).
183. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
C aM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 524 (2005) (reporting that from 1989 to 2003, at least 340 individu-
als have been exonerated, and that many exonerations happened on retrial).
184. Sharon L. Davies, The Reality of False Confessions-Lessons of the Central Park Jogger
Case, 30 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SoC. CHANGE 209, 227 (2006) (asserting that the conviction of innocent
persons diminishes the integrity of the justice system and the public's confidence in the courts); see
also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law
not be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being
condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary
affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without
convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.").
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Further, Group 4's approach would handicap federal courts' ability to
police how state courts apply constitutional and federal law rules of criminal
procedure. Federal habeas jurisdiction allows federal courts to ensure that
individual state courts have applied the law in a uniform and constitutional185
manner. When a state court has incorrectly applied federal law, a federal
court can grant habeas relief and force the state to hold a new trial-a meas-
ure that has a significant deterrent effect on state courts' improper
practices.16 Under Group 4's approach, however, federal courts would have
no means of disciplining state courts that incorrectly but reasonably applied
federal or constitutional law, because they would not have the power to
grant relief. Because this approach too significantly diminishes the power of
federal habeas courts to grant meritorious petitions from improperly con-
victed defendants who allege serious errors, the Supreme Court should not
adopt it.
The best approach is that used in the opinions of Group 2: applying
Brecht to determine whether the state court's harmless error analysis was
objectively unreasonable under AEDPA. Ostensibly, this approach applies
both Brecht and AEDPA, but federal habeas courts still have enough flexi-
bility to find errors non-harmless when they have a "substantial and
injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."'87 Unlike
Group 4's approach, which provides a more superficial federal review,
Group 2's approach would allow federal courts a meaningful opportunity to
revisit the harmfulness of errors. With a more searching review, federal
courts could vigorously police the uniformity of state court application of
federal and constitutional law. 8 Federal judges, who are experts on federal
and constitutional law,'" have the final word on the application of that law.
Under Group 2's approach, federal judges can overturn convictions when a
state court application is incorrect and harmful, rather than only when the
state courts' application is incorrect, harmful, and objectively unreasonable.
Group 2's approach would also provide for the appearance of fairness to
a greater extent because it would allow federal judges, who may be less
185. See R. Stephen Painter, Jr., Note, O'Sullivan v. Boerckel and the Default of State Prison-
ers' Federal Claims: Comity or Tragedy?, 78 N.C. L. REv. 1604, 1642-43 (2000) ("The give and
take of two courts of concurrent jurisdiction result in a dialectical federalism that respects state
autonomy while at the same time encouraging the uniform adjudication of federal law.").
186. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("[Tihe threat of ha-
beas serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate courts throughout the land to
conduct their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional standards." (quoting
Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 262-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting))).
187. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States,
328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)).
188. See supra notes 183-186.
189. Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 US 473,484 (1981); see also Erwin Chemer-
insky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REv. 593, 593 (199t) ("In the 1953 case of Brown v.
Allen, the Supreme Court concluded that federal. habeas corpus petitioners may relitigate constitu-
tional issues tried in state court because, in Justice Frankfurter's words, 'even the highest state
courts' had failed to give adequate protection to federal constitutional rights." (quoting 344 U.S.
443, 511 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))).
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biased and more independent than state judges, to review state prisoners'
claims in a more circumspect manner. State judges, who are often elected,
might be more willing to call non-harmless errors harmless so as to secure
convictions and appear tough on crime for their constituents.'9 In Group 4's
approach, when federal courts separately apply AEDPA and Brecht to state
court harmless error determinations, state court judges have a nearly un-
checked ability to immunize their convictions from reversal on federal
habeas review. State court judges can call harmful errors harmless and
thereby effectively insulate the conviction from reversal on federal habeas
review. On the other hand, federal judges hold life appointments, and their
analyses are less likely to be swayed by a desire to assuage members of the
public. Group 2's approach recognizes that independent federal judges with
life appointments can provide a meaningful check on the soundness of state
criminal processes and the accuracy of state convictions.
Group 2's incorporation of the Brecht standard into AEDPA's analysis is
also acceptable under current law. Courts presume that Congress knows the
federal judiciary's interpretation of statutes it plans to amend.' 91 In drafting
AEDPA, Congress made no specific mention of Brecht or harmless error
review.192 Instead, AEDPA says merely that habeas relief "shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim" is either "contrary
to" or an -unreasonable application of' clearly established federal law, as
defined by the Supreme Court, or "based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceed-
ing."'' 93 This language does not prescribe a new and separate test. Indeed,
AEDPA does not preclude federal habeas courts from using Supreme Court
standards, such as the Brecht standard, to determine whether a state court
decision is objectively unreasonable.' 94 AEDPA requires federal habeas
courts to defer to state court determinations; 195 however, the deferential prin-
ciples "embodied in AEDPA are fully consistent with Brecht's standard for
190. For a general discussion of elected judges' use of tough-on-crime campaigns, see Joanna
Cohn Weiss, Note, Tough on Crime: How Campaigns for State Judiciary Violate Criminal Defen-
dants' Due Process Rights, 81 N.YU. L. REv. 1101 (2006); see also Steven P. Croley, The
Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 689, 727
(1995).
191. See Firstar Bank v. Faul, 253 F.3d 982, 988 (7th Cir. 2001) ("[Clourts presume that Con-
gress will use clear language if it intends to alter an established understanding about what a law
means; if Congress fails to do so, courts presume that the new statute has the same effect as the
previous version.").
192. Robertson v. Cain, 324 F.3d 297, 306 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[N]othing in the text or the legis-
lative history of AEDPA specifically or generally alludes to an alteration in the application of federal
harmless error doctrine to a state court decision.").
193. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(d)(l)-(2) (2000).
194. Robertson, 324 F.3d at 306 ("The words of the statute simply cannot be read to bar fed-
eral courts from further examination and review of state habeas claims based on additional standards
established by Supreme Court precedent, especially when those standards are not inconsistent with
the language and purpose of AEDPA.").
195. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,409 (2000).
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harmless error and with Brecht's observations concerning the limited role of
the federal courts in habeas cases."'196 In fact, because Brecht's standard is
already deferential to the states, it seems redundant to apply AEDPA and
Brecht separately, as in Group 4's approach. Group 2's approach is consis-
tent with AEDPA.
The Supreme Court should adopt the standard of Group 2, in which
Brecht analysis is incorporated into AEDPA analysis. Unlike Congress's
proposed solution, which unnecessarily strips the federal courts of jurisdic-
tion, the standard of Group 2 ensures that independent federal judges hear
state convicts' federal law and constitutional claims even when a state court
has determined any errors to be harmless. Group 2's approach avoids the
level of relitigation entailed in Chapman's standard, which the Supreme
Court explicitly rejected in Brecht.9' Yet, unlike Group 4's AEDPA-then-
Brecht approach, federal courts retain the authority to revisit state court de-
terminations of harmlessness. Under Group 2's approach, federal judges
may provide more than a cursory check of state court decisions for reason-
ableness; they may effectively nullify state court convictions where those
convictions are incorrect and unjust. By providing a more searching federal
review, Group 2's approach enhances the appearance of fairness, provides a
meaningful check on the accuracy of state court convictions, and contributes
to the uniform application of federal and constitutional law.
CONCLUSION
This Note argues that claims that federal habeas courts reverse state
court decisions too often are unfounded because most circuit courts affirm
state court convictions when the state has determined any errors to be harm-
less. Federal habeas courts should not be stripped of habeas jurisdiction;
instead, the Supreme Court should clarify harmless error law because fed-
eral courts are not applying it in a uniform or coherent manner. This Note
categorizes the four types of harmless error review currently employed by
the circuit courts and concludes that the proper solution is to adopt a test for
harmless error in which the standard of Brecht v. Abrahamson is integrated
into AEDPA analysis.
196. Robertson, 324 F.3d at 306.
197. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 622-23 (1993).
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APPENDIX
TABLE I:
CIRCUIT COURT AGREEMENT/DISAGREEMENT WITH
STATE COURT DETERMINATION OF HARMLESSNESS
Circuit Court
Agreed/
Disagreed
with State
Finding of
Harmless Capital
Circuit Year Case Error Case?
1 st 2005 Pertrillo v. O'Neill, 428 F3d 41, 44-45 Agreed
2006 Isasi v. Herbert, 176 F. App'x 143, 145 Agreed
2d 2004 Gutierrez v. McGinnis, 389 F3d 300, 303-08 Agreed
2004 Zappulla v. NY, 391 F.3d 462, 466-75 Disagreed
3d 2004 Affinito v. Hendricks, 366 F.3d 252, 262-63 Agreed
2003 Lewis v. Pinchak, 348 F.3d 355, 359-60 Agreed
2005 Simpson v. Polk, 129 F App'x 782, 788-94 Agreed *
4th 2005 Jones v. Polk, 401 F3d 257, 264-66 Agreed *
2004 Allen v. Lee, 366 F3d 319, 322, 343-50 Disagreed *
2005 Nixon v. Epps, 405 F.3d 318,328-33 Agreed
5th 2004 Cole v. Dretke, 99 F. App'x 523, 531-33 Agreed
2003 Hopkins v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d 579, 582-86 Agreed
2006 Fulcher v. Motley, 444 F.3d 791, 794, 80-11 Disagreed
2006 Broom v. Mitchell, 441 F3d 392, 407, 412-14 Agreed *
2005 Bates v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635, 641-49 Disagreed *
2005 Ruimveld v. Birkett, 404 F3d 1006, 1012-18 Disagreed
2005 Madrigal v. Bagley, 413 F3d 548, 550-53 Disagreed _
2005 Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F.3d 783, 787, 791 Disagreed
2005 Jordan v. Hurley, 397 F.3d 360, 363-65 Agreed
2004 Wesener v. Straub, 110 F. App'x 614, 623-25 Agreed
2004 Bell v. Hurley, 97 F App'x 11, 15-17 Agreed
6th 2004 Scott v. Gundy, 100 F App'x 476, 476-82 Disagreed
2004 Henry v. Martin, 105 F App'x 786, 790-94 Agreed
2004 Cobum v. Howes, 100 F App'x 328, 328-330 Agreed
2003 Passino v. Tessmer, 61 F. App'x 124, 124-25, 127 Agreed
2003 Dotson v. Morgan, 2003 WL 22682426 at *1-4 Disagreed
2003 Singleton v. Carter, 74 F App'x 536, 539-41, 544-45 Agreed
2003 Hill v. Hofbauer, 337 F3d 706, 718 Disagreed
2003 Tucker v. Warden Ohio State Penitentiary, Agreed2003_ 64 F App'x 467, 472-73
2003 Williams v. Straub, 56 F. App'x 259, 260 Agreed
7th 2006 Whitman v. Bartow, 434 F3d 968, 971-72 Agreed
2005 Ben-Yisrayl v. Davis, 431 F3d 1043, 1047, 1051-53 Disagreed *
8th 2004 Brown v. Luebbers, 371 F3d 458, 462-70 Agreed *
9th 2006 Earle v. Runnels, 176 F App'x 883, 886 Agreed
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Circuit Court
Agreed/
Disaqreed
with State
Finding of
Harmless Capital
Circuit Year Case Error Case?
Villescas v. Hernandez, 163 F. App'x 612, 613-614 Agreed
2006 Hernandez v. Pliler, 2006 WL 377136 at *2 Agreed
2006 Hasan v. Galaza, 165 F App'x 557, 559-60 Agreed
2005 Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F.3d 1055,1057-62 Agreed
2005 Earp v. Stokes, 149 F App'x 607, 609-612 Agreed
2005 Tidwell v. Calderon, 134 F App'x 141,143 Disagreed
2005 Blakely v. Terhune, 126 F App'x 396, 397-99 Agreed
2005 Sims v. Brown, 425 F3d 560, 567, 570-73 Agreed
Agreed
2005 McNeil v. Middleton, 402 E.3d 920, 922-23 (after reversed
by Supreme
Ct.)
2005 Beltran v. Knowles, 121 F. App'x 182, 184-85 Disagreed
2005 Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F3d 993,1007-09 Disagreed
2005 Allen v. Woodford, 395 F3d 979, 1011-15 Agreed
2004 Nettles v. Newland, 105 F. App'x 144,147 Agreed
2004 Palumbo v. Ortiz, 89 F. App'x 3,4-6 Agreed
2004 Diaz v. Hickman, 101 F App'x 726, 726-27 Agreed
2004 Medina v. Homung, 386 F3d 872, 876-78 Agreed
2004 Duran v. Castro, 102 F App'x 631,632 Agreed
2004 Parle v. Runnels, 387 F3d 1030,1034-35,1044-45 Agreed
2004 Beltran v. Roe, 111 F App'x 970, 970-71 Agreed
2004 Beardslee v. Brown, 393 F3d 1032,1035-36,1041 Agreed *
2003 Martinez v. Castro, 77 F App'x 403, 403-04 Agreed
2003 Evanchyk v. Stewart, 340 F3d 933, 940-43 Disagreed
2003 Dao v. Terhune, 57 F App'x 779, 779-80 Agreed
2003 Statler v. Garcia, 78 F App'x 22, 23-24 Disagreed
2003 Mai v. Prunty, 75 F App'x 586, 587-89 Agreed
2003 McNeil v. Castro, 81 F App'x 901, 902 Agreed
2003 Paulinkonis v. Ryder, 82 F App'x 514, 518-19 Agreed
2003 Johnson v. Garcia, 80 F. App'x 599, 600 Agreed
Hunter v. Parin, 68 F. App'x 59, 59 Agreed
2006 Hamilton v. Mullin, 436 F3d 1181,1187-1197 Agreed *
2006 Bowman v. Neal, 172 F App'x 819, 828-29 Agreed
10th 2005 Malicoat v. Mullin, 426 F3d 1241,1244,1247,1262-63 Agreed *
2005 Patton v. Mullin, 425 F3d 788, 800-01,810 Agreed *
2003 Spears v. Mullin, 343 F3d 1215,1232-33 Agreed *
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TABLE 2:
NINTH CIRCUIT APPROACHES TO HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS WHEN
THERE IS A STATE COURT DETERMINATION OF HARMLESSNESS
Circuit Court
Disagreed or
Agreed with
State Court
Determination of
Year Case Harmless Error
Group 1: Court applied Brecht only.
2006 Hernandez v. Pliler, 2006 WL 377136 at *2 Agreed
2005 Tidwell v. Calderon, 134 F App'x 141,143 Disagreed
2005 Blakeley v. Terhune, 126 F App'x 396, 397-99 Agreed
2005 Sims v. Brown, 425 F3d 560,570-73 Agreed
2005 Beltran v. Knowles, 121 F. App'x 182, 184-85 Disagreed
2004 Allen v. Woodford, 395 F3d 979,1011-15 Agreed
2005 Palumbo v. Ortiz, 89 F. App'x 3, 4-6 Agreed
2004 Parle v. Runnels, 387 F3d 1030,1034-35,1044-45 Agreed
2004 Beardslee v. Brown, 393 F.3d 1032,1035-36, 1041 Agreed
2003 Evanchyk v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 933, 940-41 Disagreed
2003 Statler v. Garcia, 78 F App'x 22, 23-24 Disagreed
2003 Mai v. Prunty, 75 F App'x 586, 587-89 Agreed
2003 Hunter v. Parin, 68 F App'x 59, 59 Agreed
Group 2: Court applied Brecht, and finding the error harmful/harmless under Brecht,
concluded that the state court harmless error determination is/isn't an
"unreasonable application" under AEDPA.
2005 Castillo v. McFadden, 399 F3d 993, 1007-09 Disagreed
2004 Diaz v. Hickman, 101 F App'x 726, 726-27 Agreed
2003 McNeil v. Castro, 81 F. App'x 901, 902 Agreed
2003 Dao v. Terhune, 57 F App'x 779, 779-80 Agreed
Group 3: Court only applied AEDPA without considering Brecht.
2006 Hasan v. Galaza, 165 F App'x 557, 559-60 Agreed
2005 McNeil v. Middleton, 402 F3d 920, 921-23 Agreed
2004 Nettles v. Newland, 105 F App'x 144,147 Agreed
2004 Beltran v. Roe, 111 F App'x 970, 970-71 Agreed
2003 Paulinkonis v. Ryder, 82 F App'x 514, 518-19 Agreed
Group 4: Court applied AEDPA, then mentioned or applied Brecht.
2006 Earle v. Runnels, 176 F App'x 883, 886 Agreed
2006 Villescas v. Hernandez, 163 F App'x 612, 613-614 Agreed
2005 Earp v. Stokes, 149 F App'x 607, 609-612 Agreed
2005 Inthavong v. Lamarque, 420 F3d 1055,1057-62 Agreed
2004 Duran v. Castro, 102 F App'x 631, 632 Agreed
2004 Medina v. Homung, 386 F3d 872, 876-78 Agreed
2003 Martinez v. Castro, 77 F App'x 403, 403-04 Agreed
2003 Johnson v. Garcia, 80 F App'x 599, 600 Agreed
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TABLE 3:
SIXTH CIRCUIT APPROACHES TO HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS WHEN
THERE IS A STATE COURT DETERMINATION OF HARMLESSNESS
Circuit Court
Disagreed or
Agreed with
State Court
Determination of
Year Case Harmless Error
Group 1: Court applied Brecht only.
2006 Fulcher v. Motley, 444 F.3d 791,794, 808-11 Disagreed
2005 Bates v. Bell, 402 F3d 635, 641-49 Disagreed
2005 Dorchy v. Jones, 398 F3d 783, 787, 791 Disagreed
2005 Jordan v. Hurley, 397 F.3d 360, 363-65 Agreed
2004 Wesener v. Straub, 110 F. App'x 614, 623-25 Agreed
2003 Williams v. Straub, 56 F. App'x 259, 260 Agreed
2003 Dotson v. Morgan, 2003 WL 22682426 at *1-4 Disagreed
Group 2: Court applied Brecht, and finding the error harmful/harmless under Brecht,
concluded that the state court harmless error determination is/isn't an
"unreasonable application"under AEDPA.
2006 Broom v. Mitchell, 441 F.3d 392, 412-14 Agreed
2005 Ruimveld v. Birkett, 404 F.3d 1006, 1012-18 Disagreed
2004 Bell v. Hurley, 97 F App'x 11, 15-17 Agreed
2004 Scott v. Gundy, 100 F App'x 476, 476-82 Disagreed
2004 Henry v. Martin, 105 F App'x 786, 790-94 Agreed
2003 Singleton v. Carter, 74 F App'x 536, 539-41, 544-45 Agreed
2003 Tucker v. Warden Ohio State Penitentiary, Agreed
64 F App'x 467, 472-73
2003 Hill v. Hofbauer, 337 F3d 706, 718 Disagreed
Group 3: Court only applied AEDPA without considering Brecht.
2005 Madrigal v. Bagley, 413 F3d 548, 550-53 Disagreed
2003 Passino v. Tessmer, 61 F App'x 124, 124-25, 127 Agreed
Group 4: Court applied AEDPA, then mentioned or applied Brecht.
2004 Cobum v. Howes, 100 F App'x 328, 328-330 1 Agreed
February 2007]
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TABLE 4:
FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, SEVENTH, EIGHTH, & TENTH
CIRCUIT APPROACHES TO HARMLESS ERROR ANALYSIS WHEN THERE IS A
STATE COURT DETERMINATION OF HARMLESSNESS
Circuit Court Disagreed
or Agreed with State
Court Determination of
Circuit/Year Case Harmless Error
Group 1: Court applied Brecht only.
3d Cir./2004 Affinito v. Hendricks, 366 F3d 252, 262-63 Agreed
3d Cir. 2003 Lewis v. Pinchak, 348 F.3d 355, 359-60 Agreed
4th Cir./2005 Simpson v. Polk, 129 F App'x 782, 788-94 Agreed
5th Cir./2005 Nixon v. Epps, 405 F3d 318,329-330 Agreed
5th Cir./2003 Hopkins v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d 579, 582-86 Agreed
7th Cir./2006 Whitman v. Bartow, 434 F3d 968, 971-72 Agreed
10th Cir./2006 Bowman v. Neal, 172 F App'x 819, 828-29 Agreed
10th Cir./2005 Patton v. Mullin, 425 F3d 788, 800-01,810 Agreed
Group 2: Court applied Brecht, and finding the error harmfuL/harmless under Brecht,
concluded that the state court harmless error determination is/isn't an
"unreasonable application"underAEDPA.
2d Cir./2006 Isasi v. Herbert, 176 F App'x 143,145 Agreed
5th Cir./2004 Cole v. Dretke, 99 F App'x 523, 531-33 Agreed
7th Cir./2005 Ben-Yisrayl v. Davis, 431 F3d 1043,1047,1051-53 Disagreed
Group 3: Court only applied AEDPA without considering Brecht.
2d Cir./2004 Zappulla v. New York, 391 F3d 462, 467-75 Disagreed
2d Cir./2004 Gutierrez v. McGinnis, 389 F3d 300, 303-08 Agreed
8th CirJ2004 Brown v. Luebbers, 371 F3d 458, 462-70 Agreed
10th Cir./2006 Hamilton v. Mullin, 436 F3d 1181, 1187-1197 Agreed
10th Cir./2005 Malicoat v. Mullin, 426 F3d 1241,1247,1262-63 Agreed
10th CirJ2003 Spears v. Mullin, 343 F3d 1215,1232-33 Agreed
Group 4: Court applied AEDPA, then mentioned or applied Brecht.
1st Cir./2005 Pertrillo v. O'Neill, 428 F3d 41, 44-45 Agreed
4th CirJ2005 Jones v. Polk, 401 F3d 257, 264-66 Agreed
4th Cir./2004 Allen v. Lee, 366 F3d 319, 322,343-50 Disagreed
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